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Abstract 
This paper investigates the political incentives for the design of social security 
policy in competitive democracies with both far-sighted and myopic households. The 
social security scheme depends on both a payroll tax rate which determines the size of 
the pension and a Bismarckian factor that represents its redistributive component. By 
considering a probabilistic voting setting of electoral competition, we analyze the 
political game between office-seeking politicians and self-interested citizens. 
Politicians can win the election by targeting the voters in each group by trading off 
the generosity and the redistribution degree of the public pension system. In the 
political equilibrium, the contribution rate is U-shaped with respect to the 
Bismarckian factor. Moreover, the equilibrium Bismarckian factor unambiguously 
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1. Introduction 
The optimal design of social security policy remains a classic issue in public 
economics. Previous studies addressing the effects of social security to people’s 
well-being mainly adopt the standard consumer behavior assumption - the life-cycle 
hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani, 1963), which states that consumers naturally 
smooth their consumption over life time. However, emerging evidence and empirical 
studies suggest that in reality consumer behavior does not always abide such a rule.1 
One of the key characteristics is that people often behave myopically when facing 
both short-term and long-term choices, even though they regret not having saved 
enough afterwards. Behavioral economists developed several frameworks in modeling 
shortsighted consumers with respect to different non-standard preferences. To new a 
few, Laibson (1997) proposed the quasi hyperbolic discounting framework which was 
previously developed by Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968). Gul and 
Pesendorfer (2001) define temptation preferences over both allocations and choices 
sets, which implies that under-saving is the consequence of people getting tempted by 
small earlier rewards. If some choices feel tempting when they are available, and if 
this detracts from well-being, then an individual may prefer small choice sets to large 
ones. Instead, Feldstein (1985) and Cremer et al. (2007, 2008) widely applied the 
myopic approach to the optimal design of social security. The myopic approach is a 
simpler framework in which agents are myopic in that they do not save at all and 
focuses on individuals’ self-reported mistakes between their choices and their true 
preferences. As Pestieau and Possen (2006) put it: “[m]yopic individuals do not want 
to save because their immediate ‘self’ incites them to get instant gratification”. In 
particular, this paper follows the assumption in myopic sophisticated agents2 à la 
                                                        
1 Many studies suggest that consumption declines sharply at retirement (See e.g Hammermesh, 1984; Banks et al., 
1998). Behavioral economists suggest that individuals are not perfectly rational and sometimes have trouble 
behaving in their own best interests. Explanations provided for the non-standard saving behavior stress that 
individuals are tempted to spend and that saving requires effect and self-control. (See e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). Moreover, the last few decades have witnessed a sharp decline in the saving rate 
for most developed countries. Based on the U.S data, Laibson (1997) suggests that financial innovation may have 
caused the ongoing decline in the savings rates, since financial innovation increases liquidity, eliminating 
commitment opportunities. 
2 The alternative to sophisticated myopic agents is naïve myopic agents. The notion of “naïve and sophisticated 
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Cremer et al. (2007, 2008). In the rest of the paper we use the term “myopic” instead 
of “myopic sophisticated” for simplicity.  
Ever since the seminal contribution by Feldstein (1985), an increasing number of 
papers have incorporated the role of myopic behavior in analyzing the public pension 
systems. 3  Typical of this literature takes the normative view focusing on the 
paternalistic role of the government that uses a mandatory pension system in 
providing a commitment service and redistribution mechanism. Truly there are a 
considerable amount of studies explore the political economy of social security, 
however, none of them adequately addresses the presence of myopic agents.4 Thus, 
this paper aims to study the political implications of incorporating the myopic 
consumption behavior into the optimal design of social security.  
Moreover, we apply the probabilistic voting approach. Note that the existing 
positive literature on social security mainly adopts the majority voting approach. This 
approach is limited to only one characteristic of social security5, given that the median 
voter theorem yields no prediction when the policy space is multi-dimensional.6 This 
is rather restrictive, since the two main distinct characteristics of a pension system are 
                                                                                                                                                               
myopic agents” was first brought up by Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968). Strotz (1956) suggested that people are 
more impatient when they make short-run trade-offs than when they make long-run trade-offs. A person could be 
sophisticated and know exactly what her future selves' preferences will be. Alternatively, a person could be naïve 
and believe her future selves' preferences will be identical to her current self's, not realizing that as she gets closer 
to executing decisions her tastes will have changed. He argues that in order to avoid such time inconsistency, 
agents could decide in a sophisticated way, making an analysis of what their actions would be in the future, as a 
consequence of their changing preferences. In the literature, it has assumed either one or the other behavior, 
without attempting to justify the choice on behavioral grounds. For instance, Akerlof (1991) assumes naive beliefs, 
while Laibson (1997, 1998) assume sophisticated beliefs. Harris and Laibson (2008) introduce a continuous-time 
model of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences to solve the intra-personal game for the sophisticated agents. Cremer 
et al. (2007) discuss the optimal social security for an economy consisting of both farsighted and myopic 
sophisticated voters through majority voting. It is worth mentioning that Hey and Lotito (2009) came up with an 
experimental study analyzing the dynamic inconsistent makers’ attitudes towards dynamic inconsistency 
distinguishing subjects being naïve, resolute or sophisticated. They end up in questioning the applicability of the 
sophisticated myopic approach. However, given the widely application of this assumption in the theoretical 
literature and it seems to help generating predictions that are in line with empirical evidence on saving behavior 
(see e.g. Cremer et al., 2007, 2008). Therefore, one would need more experimental work before 
dismissing/accepting this behavioral assumption. The jury is still out.  
3 A vast literature on myopia and social security takes a normative approach, focusing on the role of myopic 
behavior in justifying the existence of a publicly provided pension system. More specifically, the existing literature 
point out that myopia is a rationale for the public pension system. See E.g., Feldstein (1985), Docquier (2002) and 
Andersen and Bhattacharya (2010). 
4 See Galasso and Profeta (2002) for a full review. To the author’s knowledge, Cremer et al. (2007) is the only 
attempt studying the political economy implications of social security with myopic agents in the context of 
majority voting. 
5 Most of this literature focuses sorely on the payroll tax rate determining the size of the social security system. 
6 See for instance, Casamatta et al. (2000b) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).  
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contributions and benefits.7 Furthermore, in a political game, the Bismarkcian factor 
(the redistribution degree of the social security) is no less crucial than the payroll tax 
rate (the size of the social security). Given that the Bismarckian factor can reduce 
inequality, it is essential element to target the lower income voters. The problems 
associated with the existence of equilibrium in high-dimensional policy spaces are 
well known (Plott, 1967). Nevertheless, probabilistic voting theory is considered as 
being an appropriate solution to these problems.8 In addition, the probabilistic voting 
model allows us to analyze entrenched voter positions that are independent of 
personal benefits derived from economic policy. Unlike the traditional way in 
modeling which preferences focusing solely on the economic benefits one receives, 
probabilistic voting also considers ideological positions unrelated to personal 
economic concerns. This implies that some people’s preferences are ‘worth’ more 
than others. One voter may cast his ballot in favor of a candidate that brings him 
lower economic benefits in exchange for a non-economic issue that for him outweighs 
the economic loss. This non-economic issue is referred to an “ideology” that is 
orthogonal to the fundamental policy dimensions of interests.9  
To be more specific, the general setting of our model follows Feldstein (1985) in 
assuming that all individuals have equal earnings and identical tastes but differ in 
their behavior types (being either farsighted or myopic). There is no account for 
uncertainty in future rates of return, rates of population growth, productivity or 
demographics. It is assumed that individuals hold rational expectations and anticipate 
the effect of policy on equilibrium outcomes. We consider a simple two-period 
overlapping generations model, with people working in the first period and retiring in 
the second. Households are non-altruistic. The voting stage occurs before the market 
stage. Voters are characterized by their behavior types and their political ideologies. 
Behavior types are divided into two interest groups, myopic group and the farsighted 
                                                        
7 Cremer et al. (2007) discuss both the size and the redistribution degree of the social security in a majority voting 
setting. The voting occurs in a sequential way. In the first stage, voters vote either for a pure Bismarckian system 
or a pure Beveridgean system, then, they vote for the payroll tax rate. 
8 See e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Coughlin (1992), Dixit and Loudregan (1996) (1998), Persson and 
Tabellini (2002). By introducing uncertainty to the voting process, it incorporates a random element to any voter’s 
utility calculation, which is modeled through the mechanics of probability theory. 
9 These characteristics are permanent and cannot be credibly altered in the course of electoral competition. 
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group. 10  Foresighted households adjust their private savings and labor supply 
decisions by rationally anticipating the wealth implications of the social security 
policy. Instead the myopic individuals focus solely on current consumption and save 
nothing in the market stage. Note that the problem with the myopes is not being 
shortsighted per se, but lacking of self-control when facing saving and labor supply 
decisions in the first period. However, the myopes are sophisticated in the voting 
stage that they vote with a long-term rationale despite the fact they suspect their 
behavior with nonetheless be myopic in the first period.11 
The social security policy is determined in the probabilistic voting setting. Two 
office-seeking politicians enter into electoral competition. Voters vote for the 
Bismarckian factor and the payroll tax rate simultaneously. Voters care about both the 
social security policy and their own political ideologies. The farsighted and the 
myopic groups hold different political homogeneity representing their ability to exert 
political pressure in acquiring their preferred social security policy. There is no 
presumption on whether one group is more political homogenous than the other.12  
The focus of the current model is on the sensitivity of the two specific groups’ 
(myopic and farsighted) voting behavior with respect to different social security 
policies. Targeting the votes of the two groups can be done through two channels: the 
size (positively related to the contribution rate τ ) and the redistribution degree 
(negatively related to the Bismarckian factor α ). These two parameters differ in 
targeting the two groups and can be used as substitute tools. The unique 
Nash-equilibrium can be characterized analytically. 13  In the equilibrium the 
                                                        
10 The standard approach is to consider two interests groups composed the young and old generations, respectively. 
For instance, Profeta (2002) presented a probabilistic voting model investigating a political game between the 
young and the old group. However, that is not the focus of this paper. 
11 The assumption of myopic sophisticated agents is crucial for generating a political equilibrium with a positive 
pension system. When we consider the myopic agents to be fully myopia that they are myopic not only in the 
market stage but as well in the voting stage, they would simply vote for no social security. On the other hand, the 
farsighted agents prefer private saving than social security. Thus, in the fully myopia setting, no social security 
will be implemented in the political equilibrium. 
12 Some may argue that the farsighted care less about social security given that they naturally smooth consumption 
overtime. However, this statement is fragile given that social security distorts their labor supply and, consequently, 
their consumption levels. Naturally, the voters inside the myopic group pay attention to social security policy as 
they expect the government forcing them saving and compensating them when retired. Therefore, we do consider 
both cases in which either the farsighted or the myopic are (exogenously) more politically homogeneous than the 
other group. 
13 To focus on the effects of myopia instead of the intergenerational transfers or the capital accumulation, we 
assume zero population growth and zero interest rate. Note that the assumption on the equality between the interest 
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contribution rate and the Bismarckian factor are determined endogenously. This 
differs from the median voter setting in Cremer et al. (2007), where voters vote 
sequentially first between a pure Bismarckian system and a Beveridgean system, then, 
the payroll tax rate for the chosen system. Furthermore, we characterize the 
closed-form solution with the logarithmic utility function. The results of the 
theoretical model are numerically illustrated in the simulation part. 
To preview the main results, the payroll tax rate is a U-shaped function with respect 
to the Bismarckian factor in the equilibrium with a turning point at a high value of the 
Bismarckian factor. This implies that the tax rate will be higher under both a less 
Bismarckian system (in which pension benefits are less related to one’s contributions) 
and a pure Bismarckian System (in which pension benefits fully depend on one’s first 
period contributions) than in systems that are close to the pure Bismarckian system.14 
The underlying economic mechanism is that social security does not only create 
redistribution in favor of the myopic group, but also causes distortions to the labor 
supply for all. The distortion for the myopic agent’s labor supply is higher and is only 
related to the payroll tax rate. Instead, the farsighted agents are less distorted as their 
labor supply decisions are influenced by both the payroll tax rate and the Bismarckian 
factor. The lower the payroll tax rate, the higher is the Bismarckian factor, the lower 
is the distortion. The U-shaped relationship between the payroll tax rate and the 
Bismarckian factor results from the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution.  
                                                                                                                                                               
rate and the population growth rate is crucial for our results as we look into the steady-state political equilibrium 
instead of the dynamic political equilibrium. Our model is restricted as we consider only one single generation and 
that voting happens only once. In a standard OLG model setting, with our assumptions on interest rates and 
population growth, the political equilibrium arises in a steady-state sequence where only the young vote and make 
the presumption that the system they adopt will as well be adopted by the next generation. On the contrary, see for 
example below the literature exploring the inter-generational game in a dynamic economy. Cooley and Soares 
(1999) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) stress the role of general equilibrium effects to explain why the 
politico-economic equilibrium is in favor of intergenerational transfers. Recently, Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt 
(2008) provide an application of the probabilistic voting model in a standard OLG model, focusing on the effect of 
the projected demographic transition on the politico-economic dynamic equilibrium for social security. 
14 Note that in our model, there is no room for a pure Beveridgean system (in which benefits are unrelated to a 
worker’s contribution). This is closed related to two assumptions: first, we assume homogeneous productivity 
across individuals. Therefore, income inequality only depends on one’s behavior type; Second, the individual 
preferences take an inseparable form with respect to consumption and labor supply. Therefore, when myopes exist 
in the economy, the farsighted always preferred policy is a purely Bismarckian system, while the myopic preferred 
policy is an impure contributive system, given that they are aware that farsighted individual’s labor supply is less 
distorted if the pension system is more Bismarckian. At this stage, we assume away the productivity heterogeneity 
to focus on the effects of myopia and political preferences. This is because the effects of uncertainty in 
productivity will compound with the effects of the uncertainty in myopia and political preferences in the optimal 
design of social security. However, we leave to future work a more complete analysis of the interaction between 
these factors. 
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Given that the farsighted agents provide more labor supply than the myopes, the 
redistribution component in social security is therefore in favor of the myopic group. 
A society with more myopic agents therefore prefers a more redistributive pension 
system. Instead, the payroll tax rate curve is U-shaped with respect to the size of the 
myopic agents. This link again comes from the tradeoff between redistribution and 
efficiency. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and 
characterizes the equilibrium results. A numerical simulation applying the logarithmic 
utility function is conducted in section 3. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The model 
2.1 Stages of the game 
Two political parties represented by two office-seeking candidates enter into 
electoral competition. Both candidates choose the social security policy platforms 
simultaneously and do not cooperate. Politicians credibly commit to their own social 
security policy platforms. The social security policy includes two elements: the 
payroll tax rate representing the size of the pension system, and the Bismarckian 
factor that measures the contributory parameter of the pension system. Each party 
holds fixed ideological positions non-related with economic policy such as positions 
on value issues. The party that obtains the majority of the votes wins the election and 
implements the promised policies. 
Voters differ in two dimensions: their behavior type as farsighted or myopic agents 
and in their political ideology biases. Voters are motivated by both these two 
categories; private income and consumption on one hand, and political ideological 
preference on the other. Citizens may either be heterogeneously biased towards a 
certain party or share a common valuation of the competing parties. People vote for 
the party that suits his own interests, given promised economic policies as well as 
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their own political ideological views. 
Figure 1 shows the timing of the events as well as the information sets for both the 
political parties and the voters.  
 
Figure 1: The Timing of the Political Game 
 
 
 
More precisely, the political game has four sequential stages: 
Stage 1 – Policy Announcements: 
Taking its opponent’s policy platform as given, each political candidate chooses a 
social security policy platform to maximize its chances of winning the election. 
Parties take into account the political preferences of citizens, anticipating the labor 
supply choice and saving pattern for each type of agents (far-sighted and myopic). 
Stage 2 – Election: 
During the election, the far-sighted and myopic voters vote according to their true 
preference given the economic policy announcements and their ideological biases. It 
is worth noting that when voting, the myopic sophisticated agents consider their 
long-time welfare anticipating that their myopic-self will emerge in the last stage 
when the platform is implemented. They are purely myopic when making labor 
supply and saving decisions in the last stage that they disregards their second period 
utility at this stage. 
Stage 3 – Policy Implementation: 
We assume the winning political candidate actually implements the policies 
● 
t = 1 
● 
t = 2
●
t = 3
Two political 
candidates anticipate 
the behavior of the 
voters, propose their 
platform 
simultaneously  
Voters vote 
according to 
their true 
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Voting result 
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winning political 
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the promised 
platform ( ,α τ )
●
Far-sighted and myopic 
individuals make labor 
supply and saving 
decisions according to the 
implemented social 
security scheme ( ,α τ ). 
t = 4
Time
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proposed during the election campaign. 
Stage 4 – Individual Decision Making: 
Individuals have two roles, one as a voter and one as a participant in the labor 
market and benefits system. We employ a standard two-period framework with 
time-separable utility, wherein individuals make only two decisions in labor supply 
and savings. The farsighted agents naturally smooth their consumption between the 
two periods. Consumption decisions are assumed to exhibit a simple form of myopia 
for the myopes, thereby they focus merely in the present period consumption and save 
nothing. Each individual pays a linear income tax for social security in the first period 
and expect to receive a pension benefit in the second period, which consists of a flat 
benefit and a contributive component associated with his first period contribution.  
Regarding the information sets, the political parties are informed of the size of both 
the myopic and farsighted groups. Parties are not informed of the party attachment of 
the each voter, but are aware of the distribution of relative ideological biases of each 
group. The voters are only aware that there are two types of agents in the economy, 
however, without information about either the size or the political preferences of both 
groups.15 The lack of information on size is crucial for our results as it contributes to 
the individual’s uncertainty about future pension benefits, given that it depends on the 
size of both groups. 
We characterize the local equilibrium of the political game by backward induction. 
 
2.1.1 Fourth Stage: Individual Decision Making 
Individuals need to make decisions in two stages: the voting stage and the market 
stage. The voting stage happens before the market stage. It is worth mentioning that 
the myopic individuals are only myopic in the market stage but sophisticated in the 
                                                        
15 Here we assume that the political candidates are more informed than the voters, since they are more 
privileged in obtaining information through organization or agencies while the normal people can not easily access 
such information individually. Moreover, the political parties are motivated to pay higher information costs to 
public organization or consulting firm so as to get elected. Instead, although a single individual might care about 
the social security policy, he is either too lazy (acting like a free rider) or finds it too costly to obtain such 
information. 
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voting stage, however, anticipating that they will behave myopically in the market 
stage. 
Market Stage 
We consider a simple two-period overlapping generations economy inhabited by 
groups of representative agents. Population consists of two types: the far-sighted 
rational agents and the short-sighted myopic agents. The rate of population growth 
and the interest rate equal zero. People produce a single good which can be consumed 
or saved as storage goods for future consumption. The production function is linear in 
labor. There are two markets in the economy: a labor market and a consumption good 
market. We impose market clearing conditions in each period.  
Individuals live for two periods: old and young. They work in the first period and 
retire in the second period. Generations are unlinked, meaning that households are 
non-altruistic. We denote the population by { , }i F M=  where F  represents the 
far-sighted agent and M  stands for the myopic agent. The proportion for each group 
is Fλ  and Mλ , 1F Mλ λ+ = . Productivity is assumed to be homogenous across 
population.16 Unlike Cremer et al. (2007) where one’s income is formalized of the 
productivity and the labor effort decision, here one’s income is only the result of labor 
effort decision. Moreover, in Cremer et al. (2007) agents differ in myopia and 
productivity, in our model individuals differ in myopia and the political ideology. 
The intertemporal utility function representing the “true preference” for the 
representative agent in group i is: 
               2( ) ( ) ( 2) ( )i i i i i i i iU u x u d u c l u dγ γ= + = − +               (1) 
where ,  c d ∈\  denote the first and second period consumption, l  is the labor 
supply in the first period. Note that quadratic disutility of labor is not crucial, what 
                                                        
16 Firstly, we assume homogenous productivity as so to focus on the intragenerational transfer related to myopia 
but not on income inequality. In fact, if we introduced heterogeneous productivity we will have labor distortion 
effects not only related to being myopia but also related to wage levels, which would make it difficult to single out 
the role of myopia. Moreover, wage heterogeneity will complicate the political ideology biases of the voters which 
currently are only related to their behavior types (being farsighted or myopic). This will in turn introduce multiple 
effects to the optimal path of the social security policy. I doubt if it is feasible to introduce heterogeneous 
productivity in the probabilistic voting setting. However, trying to incorporate heterogeneous productivity into the 
framework would be a good direction for future research. 
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makes a difference is the quasi-linear specification that assumes away income 
effects.17 The utility function U  satisfies the following assumptions:  
 
Assumption 1: U  is twice continuously differentiable.  
Assumption 2: 0, 0, 0, 0x d xx ddU U U U> > < <  
Assumption 3: 0xdU >  
 
Assumption 1, 2 are rather standard, ensuring differentiability and strong 
monotonicity conditions on U , respectively. Assumption 3 is a sufficient condition to 
ensure that x  and d  are normal goods.  
' ( , )i iU x d  is the marginal utility of an extra transfer of consumption for group i. It 
captures the degree of diminishing returns to private consumption. The higher is the 
value of marginal utility of consumption for group i, the easier the parties can attract 
the votes of group i by offering small economic benefits.  
The parameter iγ  represents the preference for future consumption for each type, 
where Fγ =1 for the far-sighted and for the myopes Mγ =0 ex ante but Mγ =1 ex post. 
When people make decisions on labor supply and consumption/saving, the far-sighted 
do so with Fγ =1 but myopes do so according to their ex ante preference where 
Mγ =0. This implies that the far-sighted agents naturally smooth their consumption 
overtime, make the optimal labor supply and saving decisions considering their 
lifetime welfare whereas the myopic agents consume all the disposable income and 
save none in the first period, but regret for not saving enough when they retire in the 
second period. 
Given that we assume homogenous productivity, wage is normalized to w =1 and 
we drop it henceforth. The budget constraints in each period are derived accordingly: 
                                                        
17 In this setting, leisure is not taken into account as a normal good. See e.g. Sommacal (2006) for a detailed 
discussion of the role of labor supply in evaluating the redistributive impact of a pension system with different 
utility functions. 
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(1 )                                                   (2)i i ix s lτ+ = −
                                                          (3)i i id s p= +                  
Eq. (2) describes that an individual’s first period net income after tax, (1 ) ilτ− , is 
equal to the net consumption, ix , plus the amount of saving, is . Eq. (3) indicates that 
an individual’s consumption in the second period, id , depends on his first period 
saving, is , plus the pension benefits after retirement, ip . The pension, ip , consists 
of a contributive component and a redistribution part: 
[ (1 ) ]                                       (4)i ip l E lτ α α= + −  
                                                 (5)F F M FEl l E l Eλ λ= +              
El  is the average before-tax income and E is the expectation operator. The 
parameter [0,1]α ∈  is often referred to as the Bismarckian or the redistribution 
factor.18 In a pure Beveridgean pension system ( 0α = ), ip p Ewlτ= = , and each 
individual receives a flat social benefit. The higher α  is, the more Bismarckian the 
social security becomes. When 1α = , we have i i ip w lτ= , a pure Bismarckian 
system indicating that one’s pension is proportional to his contribution.  
Each voter votes sincerely that he votes based on his private information. The 
voters are not aware of the exact amount of the far-sighted and the myopic agents in 
the economy. However, they do acknowledge the distribution function for each type 
agent. We assume Fλ  and Mλ  are random variables which are uniformly 
distributed between 0 and 1: 
,  [0,  1]F M Uλ λ ∼  
Therefore, in the voting stage both type agents anticipate that 1( ) ( )
2
F ME Eλ λ= = . 
Accordingly, the pension benefits represented in Eq. (4) can be rewritten as follows: 
                                                        
18 The Bismarckian factor (e.g. Cremer and Pestieau, 1998; Hassler and Lindbeck, 1997) is employed to estimate 
the level of intragenerational redistribution in the public pension system, Conceptually, the Bismarckian factor 
divides the pension benefit into a flat component and into an earnings-related component. 
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1[ (1 ) ( )]                          (6)
2i i F M
p l l lτ α α= + − +  
Note that in the market stage, the farsighted individuals consider the effects of 
pension when they are making saving and labor supply decisions. Instead, the myopes 
do not take into account of this effects in the market stage given they do not save 
anyway. However, they anticipate the effects of pension in the voting stage.  
We solve the optimization problem for the far-sighted agent and myopic agent 
separately. By substituting Eq. (2), (3) and 1Fγ =  into Eq. (1), the problem of a 
far-sighted individual is thus given by: 
2
,
max ((1 ) 2 ) ( )
F F
F F F F F FS l
U u l l s u s pτ = − − − + +              (7) 
From the FOCs, yields the optimal level of labor supply and savings for the 
far-sighted:19 
(1 )Fl τ τα= − +                            (8) 
2 2 2 21 3 12
2 2 2F
s τ τ τ α τ α= − + − −                     (9) 
  We assume the individuals face no borrowing constraints 20 . The farsighted 
individuals smooth their consumption across time. Fs  is negative when the 
farsighted agents need to borrow their future pension from the government. The 
government tax the young generations to finance the pension system for the old.  
The myopes do not save for retirement and choose labor supply to maximize the 
following utility: 
2max [(1 ) 2]
           0
i
i il
M
u l l
s
τ − −
=  
                    (10) 
The myopic agent’s labor supply is: 
1Ml τ= −                          (11) 
Directly derived from Eq. (8) and (11), we find that the pension system causes 
                                                        
19 See appendix A.1 and A.2 for derivation.  
20 With borrowing constraints, the farsighted agents prefer either no social security or a pure contributive social 
security system with the payroll tax rate not exceeding ¼. Therefore, for a pure Bismarckian system when the 
payroll tax rate is higher than ¼, we simply consider the farsighted behave as the myopes. Accordingly, this 
assumption yields "less interesting" political equilibria. 
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distortions to people’s labor supply. Moreover, the myopic agents are more distorted 
than the far-sighted agents. The distortion on the labor supply of the myopic group is 
merely subject to the changes in the payroll tax rate. Instead, the far-sighted see the 
link between the contribution component of the social security and his labor income, 
thus, anticipate as well the effects of the social security’s redistribution degree when 
providing labor.  
Given that ( ) ( ) 1/ 2F ME Eλ λ= = , substituting Eq. (8) and (9) into Eq. (1), the 
indirect utility for a far-sighted agent with respect to the payroll tax rate and the 
Bismarckian factor is obtained as: 
21 (1 )( , ) 2 [ ]
4
FV u α ττ α − −=                    (12) 
The indirect utility function with respect to ( , )τ α  for a myopic agent is:21 
2 2(1 ) (1 )( , ) [ ] [ (1 ) ]
2 2
MV a u uτ α α ττ τ τ− −= + − +             (13) 
 
Voting Stage 
In the voting stage, an individual choose to vote for the social security policy that is 
closer to his own preference. We characterize the preference over social security 
policy for both types of agents by optimizing the indirect utility functions with respect 
to ( , )τ α  from Eq. (12) and (13)22. The results are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The group-specific preference is such that 
i) the most preferred social security policy of the farsighted group * *( , )F Fτ α  is 
given by: 
                                                        
21 This indirect utility function is the ex post utility function for the myopic group, which reflects its true 
preference. 
22 See Appendix A.3 for the derivation. 
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* *1,  [0,  1]
  sec
F F
No social urity
α τ⎧ = ∈⎨⎩
 
ii) the most preferred social security policy of the myopic group * *( , )M Mτ α  is 
given by: 
* * '( ) '( )1 ,  72 '( ) '( )
4
M M
M M
M M
u x u d
u x u d
α τ −= =
−
 
iii) for the myopic group, the relation of the most preferred payroll tax rate to the 
    Bismarckian factor is: 
*
*
10      
2
10      
2
M
M
when
when
τ αα
τ αα
⎧∂ > >⎪⎪ ∂⎨∂⎪ < <⎪ ∂⎩
. 
Proof: see the Appendix A.3 for derivation. 
 
As we mentioned before, the social security affects the farsighted group in two 
ways: distortion effect in labor supply and redistribution effect of the labor income 
from the farsighted group to the myopic group. The former effect lowers the 
farsighted individual’s private consumption in both periods. The latter effect makes 
private saving more favorable than social security for the farsighted. Accordingly the 
first point of proposition 1 shows that the farsighted either prefers no social security 
or votes for a contributive (Bismarckian) pension system and do not care about the 
size of the system or simply vote for no social security. Note that in a pure 
Bismarckian system, the farsighted are free from the above two effects. The 
government simply acts like a saving institution. 
Now we turn to the second point in proposition 1 for the myopic group. Given that 
the far-sighted agents pay higher contribution to the pension system than myopic 
agents, one may intuitively presume that the myopic agents prefer a more 
redistributive social security system. However, the transfer to the myopic group 
depends both on the redistribution degree of the pension system and the labor income 
of the farsighted group. In deed, a more redistributive pension system entitles the 
myopic agents to a higher proportion of the whole pension benefits. Note that the tax 
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base depends on the labor income of the farsighted group, which is related to the 
Bismarckain factor as well. A more redistributive system causes more distortion to the 
labor supply of the farsighted group. The tax base is reduced accordingly. In fact 
when the Bismarckian factor collapses to zero, the far-sighted group’s labor supply is 
as distorted as that of the myopic agents, implying there is no transfer from the 
farsighted to the myopic group. Therefore, the most preferred Bismarckian factor is 
1
2
 resulting from a trade-off between efficiency and redistribution concerns. The 
most preferred payroll tax for the myopic group acts more like a consumption 
smoothing tool and is derived accordingly with respect to the most preferred 
Bismarckian factor. 
Lastly, for the myopic group, the most preferred payroll tax rate increases with the 
Bismarckian factor when it is less than 1
2
 but is negatively related to the 
Bismarckian factor when it exceeds 1
2
. The intuition is as follows: the optimal 
Bismarckian factor preferred by the myopic households is 1
2
, thus, the further it 
derives from this value, the less transfer the myopes will receive from the farsighted 
in the second period, thus, a higher payroll tax rate is required to smooth 
consumption.  
 
2.1.2 Second stage: Voting 
We apply the probabilistic voting that replaces the discrete and deterministic utility 
maximizing problem in the classic deterministic model with a continuously measured 
probabilistic calculation. In other words, voters’ decisions are discrete under 
deterministic assumptions but continuous under probabilistic assumption. Voters are 
ideological, candidates are uncertain in how voters’ political preference can be 
translated into party preferences. Voters care about the competing parties’ policies as 
well as an ideological dimension unrelated to the policies.23 Probabilistic assumptions 
                                                        
23 See e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) or Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
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are reasonable when we consider that candidates are rarely certain about voters’ 
preferences. This probabilistic element is to account for either inadvertent or 
deliberate uncertainty in the expected return on voting for a special candidate or 
proposal. This may arise if the candidates are too vague in their attitude towards key 
issues. Uncertainty may also arise from non-policy considerations such as personal 
qualities; complex issues such as the imperfect mapping of voter alternatives due to 
limited information; and other unpredictable factors such as technical mistakes.  
In our model, uncertainty at the voting stage comes from two separate factors: voter 
idiosyncratic ideological bias and pension benefit. The first issue is unknown to 
political parties on an individual voter basis, as it is the privately held opinion of the 
person. The second issue unknowable to a single voter. As he is not able to fully 
predict the tax base for social security. Given that the tax base depends both on the 
labor supply and the relative size of myopic and farsighted household wealth, one 
individual is not necessarily informed about the size of each group. Thus, political 
parties must maximize their vote totals assuming that voter behavior is probabilistic, 
given their inaccurate information on voters’ political ideologies as well as the voters’ 
lack of knowledge on the size of the tax base. 
Every individual is assigned a specific and potentially unique-probability of voting 
for each candidate. During the voting process, voters judge both the policy platforms 
and the non-policy criteria. Voters are not all alike in the eyes of the competing 
candidates: some voters are more important than others because they are more likely 
to reward policy favors with a vote. Electoral competition leads to equilibrium, with 
both candidates maximizing a particular social welfare function. Different voters are 
weighted by their “responsiveness,” that is, how likely they are to reward policy 
favors with a vote. 
The degree of political ideological bias in each group is captured by a density 
function. In our setting, the density functions which capture the distribution of 
political preferences of voters differ for the myopic and the rational groups. This 
density function determines the political homogeneity of each group, since more 
ideologically homogenous groups are more politically successful. Without loss of 
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generality, we do not assume that the myopic individuals are more politically 
homogenous than the farsighted per se.24  
We characterize the voters’ response to social security policy separately for the two 
types of agents. As mentioned earlier, the myopic agents can be seen to have two 
selves, one looks for immediate gratification and one looks for long term welfare in 
the traditional “dual-self” models (see e.g. Cremer et al. 2007, 2008). It is their 
myopia side when making saving and labor supply decisions, but their rational side 
which emerges when they vote.  
Two identical political parties are in competition. The set of candidates is denoted 
by 2 ( , )N A B⊂ \ . The policy announced by candidate N is NP . Before the election 
takes place, each party commits to its own policy platform AP  and BP . Each party 
is seeking office and chooses the platform that maximizes its probability of winning, 
interpreted here as its expected number of votes. The parties make binding 
commitments to social security policy platform during the electoral campaign. All 
voters vote sincerely on the two policy alternatives. We look for the Nash equilibrium, 
namely a situation in which each candidate chooses a configuration of strategies such 
that neither party can discontinuously increase his probability of winning.  
Voters differ both in their behavior type (far-sighted or myopic) and their 
underlying ideological affinities. We allow a whole spectrum of attitudes toward 
social security within each group, thus, the members of a given group are not 
politically identical with the same weights on candidates. jiσ  is the idiosyncratic 
ideological bias towards party A of individual j from group i. Voters with 0jiσ =  
care only about economic policy. We allow for these differences by letting the whole 
                                                        
24 As already mentioned in footnote 32, some may argue that myopic agents are more homogenous as they care 
more about redistributive policies and are more dependent on social security to force themselves’ saving for 
retirement, others declare although the rational agents do not care so much the size of pension system, however, 
they do care about the redistribution degree of the system as they pay the contributions. Although it is intuitively 
that the myopic agents are more sensitive to public pension system when they vote for two reasons: first, they are 
in need of a public pension system to force themselves saving; second, they desire acquiring transfers from the 
far-sighted individuals. On the other hand, some may argue that farsighted agents are sensitive to the social 
security policy as well since it influences their choices in labor supply and savings due to consumption smooth 
concern. Therefore, we do not want to make the assumption if one group is more politically homogenous than the 
other per se, instead, we consider all the possible situations.  
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functional form of the distribution jiσ depend on i. It is group specific and uniformly 
distributed: 
1 1[ , ]
2 2
ji
i iUσ φ φ−∼  
iφ  is to represent the level of “political homogeneity” of the group i . In the voting 
stage, considering every citizen allocating his political preferences among different 
issues, higher iφ  means that individuals in group i are more homogeneous in their 
political action, focusing on a single “issue”, which in our model is the social security 
policy. A group with a higher iφ  is mostly influenced by policy as opposed to 
ideology, thus, will get a bigger weight. We as well allow for the distribution 
functions to be identical for the two groups, which would be a special case in our 
analysis. 
Voter j in group i votes for party A if: 
( ) ( )i A ji i BV P V Pσ δ+ + >                
( )i AV P is the indirect utility for voters in group i  based on the policy vector 
proposed by party A, the term jiσ δ+  reflects voter j’s ideological preferences for 
party A. The distribution of political preferences is assumed to differ systematically 
across groups. δ  is the aggregate bias towards A that affects the whole population. 
This can be considered as a popularity shock. This random variable is assumed to be 
uniformly distributed as: 
1 1[ , ]
2 2
Uδ ψ ψ−∼  
Its expected value is zero and the density is ψ , which measures the “variability” of 
that population, i.e. whether it is likely to take high values. This component represents 
the source of electoral uncertainty, since it is assumed that δ  is realized between the 
announcement of the party platforms and the election. 
In the classic probabilistic voting Nash Equilibrium, the office seeking political 
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candidates are only interested in power per se.25 Competing parties target transfers to 
marginal - or “swing” – voters, i.e., those who care a lot about social security policy 
relative to the candidate’s other characteristics have more political influence, since a 
small transfer to this group leads to a greater increase in political support than the 
same transfer to groups with more extreme ideological attachments. The preferences 
of all voters are taken into account in a democracy. However, as the swing voters tend 
to be more responsive to policies: the more a group tends to consist of swing voters, 
the more their preferences will be considered. 
The neutral voters in each group, who are indifferent between party A and B are 
referred to as “swing voters”. The identity of the swing voters is crucial. We define 
the swing voters in group i as iε , represented by the following formula: 
( ) ( )i i B i AV P V Pε δ= − −                       (14) 
Voters with jiσ  lower than iε  vote for B and voters with jiσ  higher than iε  
vote for A. The equilibrium swing voters in each group are the individuals with 
parameter jiσ  equals to δ .  
Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration. The height of the distribution is measured 
by the group density iφ , which corresponds to the gain in the amount of votes in 
group per marginal increase in economic utility. A group with a lower density iφ  has 
a greater ideological dispersion. For illustration purpose, figure 2 assumes that the 
myopic group has a higher density than the far-sighted group (This does not 
necessarily hold for the rest of the paper). Suppose party A decides a more favorable 
policy to the myopes rather than the far-sighted, then party A expects a gain of votes 
from the myopic group equal to the number of swing voters from this group while a 
loss of votes equal to the number of swing voters from the far-sighted group. As the 
myopic group with a higher density Mφ is more responsive to the social security 
policy, party A would obtain a net gain of votes by favoring the myopic voters. 
                                                        
25 See, e.g., Lindbek and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996), (1998), Persson and Tabellini (2002). 
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Figure 2: A Graphic Illustration of the Distribution of the Political Ideological 
Biases 
Iφ  
 
                               Mσ  δ−   Fσ                    jIσ  
Note: For illustration purpose, the political ideological bias function for the myopic group is 
modeled with a higher density than for the far-sighted group. However, this assumption does not 
hold for the rest of the paper. 
 
2.1.3 First stage: Policy Announcements 
The political candidates are aware of the size and the policy preferences of both 
groups. The political ideologies of single voters are unknown, but the political 
candidates acknowledge the political ideology distribution functions as well as the 
densities iφ  of both groups. Candidates propose their platforms AP  and BP  
simultaneously to maximize the number of supporters. The vote share of party A in 
group i is the sum of the swing voters: 
1[ ( ) ( )]
2
A i i A i B
i V P V Pπ φ δ= + − +                   (15) 
Thus, the candidate A’s probability of winning becomes, 
,
1 1Prob  [ ]  [ ( ) ( )]
2 2
A i i i A i B
A
i F M
V P V Pδ
ψχ π λ φφ =
⎡ ⎤= ≥ = − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑       (16) 
Fφ  
Mφ  Myopic 
Far-sighted 
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where i i
i
φ λ φ≡ ∑  is the weighted average of ideological heterogeneity across 
groups.  
A representative democracy with probabilistic voting behaves as if the candidates 
are maximizing a weighted social welfare function, where the weights represent the 
voter’s responsiveness to marginal platform changes and group sizes. In our setting, 
candidates A and B maximize the expected total number of votes in the farsighted and 
the myopic groups. The policy vector is ( , )p α τ= . Party A will maximize the 
following objective function:  
,
( ) [ ]i A F A M Ai F M
i F M
E Eλ π λ π λ π
=
= +∑                 (17) 
where Aiπ  is given by Eq. (15). We can simplify Eq. (17) into the following form 
which defines party A’s policy choice problem: 
,{ , }
max [ ( ) ( )]  A i i i A i B
i F M
A Aa
W E V P V Pτ λ φ== −∑           (18) 
The problem is symmetric for political party B. Therefore, the first order 
conditions for an interior solution for the political party 2 ( , )N A B⊂ \  are as 
follows: 
,
,
( ){ }: 0                              (19)
( ){ }: 0                             (20)
N i N
i i
i F M
N i N
i i
i F M
dW dV PFoc
d d
dW dV PFoc
d d
τ λ φτ τ
α λ φα α
=
=
 = =
 = =
∑
∑
 
As shown directly from Eq. (18), as long as both groups get equal weights (the 
product of size, iλ , and density, iφ ), the political party’s task is to simply maximize 
the average voter’s utility. Instead, the group with either a bigger size, iλ , or a higher 
value in density, iφ ,  consists of more swing voters. In other words, a group which 
is more sensitive to social security will receive a higher weight in the party’s objective 
function.  
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2.2 Political Equilibrium 
First we define a strict local equilibrium of the electoral game. The set of 
candidates is denoted by 2 ( , )N A B⊂ \ , the set of voters by J, the compact, convex 
policy space by 2P ⊂ \ . The policy announced by candidate N is NP .  
 
Definition 1: Let ( , , , )G N J P W=  be an electoral game. A policy profile 
( , )E E EP τ α=  is a strict local equilibrium of G  if there exists 0ρ >  such that for 
all N  and for all PΔ  that are within ρ  of EP  (i.e., Eτ τ ρΔ − <  or 
Eα α ρΔ − < ), 
( ) ( )N E NW P W PΔ≥  
with the inequality being strict whenever EP PΔ ≠ . 
In the equilibrium: 
1) Both political parties announce their policy platforms that maximize their 
expected votes taking as given the opponent’s announced social security 
policy, each group’s budget constraints, voting and saving decisions. 
2) The representative individual in each group votes for the party that 
maximizes his own well-being taking as given each party’s announced 
platform, popularity shock and his political ideological biases. 
 
Now we solve the optimization problem for the political candidates. As each party 
faces a symmetric problem, therefore, in the political equilibrium, the proposal from 
party A and B will emerge A B EP P P= = .  
 
Proposition 2: There exists a unique local equilibrium in the probabilistic voting 
setting in which both parties propose the same social security policy EP .  
Proof: See appendix A.4 and A.5 for derivation. 
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The general form for the equilibrium social security policy could be derived by 
solving the maximization problem associated with Eq. (18). We shall be aware of the 
fact that the two variables are not independent as the generosity and the degree of 
redistribution are jointly determined. We now proceed to the voting equilibrium. We 
have already studied the social security preferred by the farsighted and the myopic 
individuals in section 2.3.1.1. Now we look into the mixed economy where the 
far-sighted individuals and the myopic agents coexist. The social security policy in the 
political equilibrium can be obtained by solving the political candidate’s 
maximization problem given by Eq. (18). We summarize the results in the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: In the political equilibrium given by Proposition 2,  
i) the equilibrium social security policy is of the following form:  
When '( ) '( )F F M MF Mu d u dλ φ λ φ<  
*
* *
*
2
'( )1                                                            21(1)
2 2 '( )
( , ) [ '( ) '( )]               21(2)
'( ) '( )[ '( ) 2 '( )] [1 ]
4 '( )
F F
F
M M
M
M M
F F
M F
M M M M
M
u d
u d
u x u d
u d u du x u d
u d
λ φα λ φ
α τ τ λ φ
λ φ
⎧ = +⎪⎪⎪= −⎨ =⎪⎪ − + −⎪⎩
 
When '( ) '( )F F M MF Mu d u dλ φ λ φ≥ , 
*
* *
*
1                                                       22(1)
( , ) '( ) '( )                             22(2)
'( ) 2 '( )
M M
M M
u x u d
u x u d
α
α τ τ
⎧ =⎪= −⎨ =⎪ −⎩
 
Proof: See the Appendix A.4 for derivation. 
ii) In the equilibrium, the optimal value of Bismarckian factor is increasing with the 
relative size, the relative political homogeneity of the farsighted group and the 
marginal utility ratio of the farsighted group’s second period consumption to that of 
the myopes. 
Proof: See Eq. 21(1). 
 
Proposition 1 shows that a fully farsighted economy always prefers a pure 
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contributive (Bismarckian) social security system or no social security whereas a 
purely myopic society prefers the Bismarckian factor equals to one half. Accordingly, 
the most preferred Bismarckian factor should be at least one half or higher.26 
Therefore, no Beveridgean system exists in our model. 
In the intermediate case, the equilibrium Bismarckian factor α  is given by Eq. 
21(1). Three effects are in concern. To start with, the relative size and the relative 
political ideology density of the far-sighted group to the myopic group have positive 
effects on the degree of redistribution. The intuition is as follows: a big size or a 
higher density means that the far-sighted group is politically stronger, accordingly. 
Thus, the political candidates would propose the social security policy that favors the 
far-sighted group. Lastly, the Bismarckian factor increases with the marginal utility 
ratio of the farsighted group’s second period consumption to that of the myopes. Note 
that the myopic agents rely on the social security to secure their second period 
consumption which is dependent solely on the pension benefits. Therefore, when this 
ratio gets bigger, increasing the Bismarckian factor may lose some votes from the 
myopic group, however, gaining more votes from the farsighted group. 
When '( ) '( )F F M MF Mu d u dλ φ λ φ≥ , meaning that the relative political power of the 
farsighted group rules over the consumption smoothing concern of the myopic group, 
the Bismarckian factor in the political equilibrium will become one to please the 
farsighted voters. However, in this case, given that the farsighted are indifferent as 
regards to the size of the social security, the politicians will propose the payroll tax 
rate according to the preference of the myopes.  
The analysis of the most preferred payroll tax rate is more complex by seeing 
directly from the final form in Eq. 22(2). To better understand the different effects in 
the determination of the equilibrium payroll tax rate, we focus on the intermediate 
form in which we have as well the equilibrium Bismarckian factor:27 
                                                        
26 Note that this result is closely related with two assumptions: the homogenous productivity and the inseparable 
preference of consumption and labor supply.  
27 See Eq. A12(1) in appendix A.4. 
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2
(The farsighted) (The myopic) (The myopic)
labor supply labor supply redistributi
distortion distortion
 
[ '( ) '( )]
[ '( ) '( )] (1 ) '( ) '( ) ( ) '( )
M M
M M
M M F F M M M M
M M F M M
u x u d
u x u d u d u d u d
λ φτ λ φ α λ φ λ φ α α λ φ
−= − − − − + −	
 	

on effect 
	

 (23) 
The terms in the numerator reflect the consumption smoothing concerns for the 
myopic group. Given that M Md x<  for all the myopic agents, the consumption 
smoothing term calls for a higher tax rate as long as the myopes’ consumption gap 
between the two periods gets larger. This effect corresponds to the social security’s 
role as a commitment device, forcing the myopic individuals saving for their second 
period. One can identify several effects regarding the denominator. The first term in 
the denominator serves as the standard consumption smoothing factor inside the 
myopic group. Therefore, in total, the consumption smoothing concerns for the 
myopic group is positively related with the size of the pension system. 
The second and third terms represent the distortion effects on the labor supply of 
the farsighted and the myopic group separately. The stronger the distortion effects are, 
the smaller the payroll tax rate is. The effects are negative for both kinds. The last 
term in the denominator indicates the redistribution effects from the farsighted group 
to the myopic group, it is positively related to the payroll tax rate. Note that all the last 
three terms are weighted by the size, the density as well as the second period marginal 
utility of the related group. To sum up, the net effects of the presence of myopic 
agents on the payroll tax rate is ambiguous. 
Even though the impact of myopic agents on the equilibrium payroll tax rate 
remains uncertain, it is worth mentioning that the equilibrium payroll tax rate when 
the pension system is Bismarckian is the most preferred payroll tax rate for the 
myopic group. (See Eq. 22(2), this result as well coincides with the desired tax rate by 
the myopic agents in Cremer et al., 2007). To gain intuition for this result, consider a 
Bismarckian system (purely contributive), the social security system generates no 
redistribution, thus, causes no externalities to the farsighted. There is perfect crowding 
out between private saving and pension for the farsighted. Thus, they are indifferent in 
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the value of the payroll tax. In fact the social security serves merely as a commitment 
device for the myopic group. Accordingly, to gain the votes from the myopic group, 
the political candidates will set the payroll tax rate as the most preferred tax rate to the 
myopic group. 
3. Numerical Simulation: The logarithmic utility case 
We denote k θβ=  ( ,F M F Mθ λ λ β φ φ= = ) to better explain the results. θ  
represents the size ratio of the farsighted group to the myopic group whereas β  
denotes the political ideology density ratio of the farsighted group to that of the 
myopic group.  
The payroll tax rate and the Bismarckian factor in the equilibrium are all implicit 
solutions, which are dependent on the concrete form of the utility function. Therefore, 
we conduct a numerical simulation with the following logarithmic utility function. 
2( 2) ( )U In c l In d= − +  
The results are displayed in the columns of Table 1 with respect to different value 
of β .  
Table 1: The Simulation Results 
 The equilibrium ( *α , *τ ) w.r.t. (θ  β ) 
θ  ( Fλ ) (α ,τ ) with β =1 (α ,τ ) with β =0.5 (α ,τ ) with β =2 
0.11  (0.10) (0.545, 0.258) (0.523, 0.259) (0.589, 0.255) 
0.25  (0.20) (0.601, 0.255) (0.551, 0.257) (0.699, 0.251) 
2/3   (0.4)   (1.000, 1/4) 
1.00  (0.50) (0.883, 0.249) (0.699, 0.251) —— 
4/3   (4/7) (1.000, 1/4)  —— 
2.33  (0.70) —— (0.941, 0.249) —— 
8/3  (0.75) —— (1.000, 1/4) —— 
Note: θ  is the size ratio of the farsighted group to the myopic group. When 1θ = , the two 
groups are equally distributed. 1θ <  indicates more myopic agents are in the economy whereas 
1θ >  means that the proportion of the farsighted group overweigh that of the myopic group. β  
denotes the density ratio representing the political homogeneity of the farsighted group to the 
myopic group. When 1β = , the farsighted and the myopic group are equally politically 
homogenous. 1β <  means the myopic group is politically homogenous whereas 1β >  means 
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the farsighted group is more politically homogenous.  
 
In particular, we study three cases. We start with the standard case with 1β = , in 
which the heterogeneity depends only on the size of each group but not the political 
homogeneity. Secondly, we assume that the myopic group is more politically 
homogenous, namely 1
2
β = . Lastly, the opposite case in which the farsighted 
individuals are more politically homogenous is taken into account: 2β = . The 
simulation is conducted with respect to different values of θ . The range we choose is 
[0.11, 0.25, 2/3, 1.00, 4/3, 2.33, 8/3], which corresponds to the proportion of the 
far-sighted group Fλ  [0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 4/7, 0.7, 0.75].  
To understand the relation between the equilibrium social security policy and the 
size of myopic agents under different β , we first start showing the relation of the 
equilibrium Bismarkcian factor and the size ratio of the farsighted group to the 
myopic group, θ , with respect to different political ideological density ratio between 
two groups, β , in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3: The Relation of the Equilibrium Bismarckian Factor *α  and θ  
 
Remark: Figure 3 illustrates how the Bismarckian factor α  is determined by the size ratio (θ ) 
and the political ideology density ratio ( β ) of the far-sighted group to the myopic group. 
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The following characteristics of the Bismarckian factor are displayed: when the 
myopic and far-sighted group are equally politically homogenous, namely 1β = , the 
most preferred Bismarckian factor is equal to 1 as long as θ  is higher than 2/3, in 
which the proportion of the rational individuals is larger than 4/7 in the society. This 
value is higher than 1/2 from the majority voting. The reason is that in our 
probabilistic voting setting, not only the size, the political homogeneity of the 
farsighted and the myopic groups matter, but also the sensitivity of how each group to 
the change in social security policy is crucial. Therefore, given that the myopic group 
is more sensitive to the change in the Bismarckian factor, a higher size of the 
farsighted group is needed to win the political game than the majority voting setting. 
Moreover, the more politically homogenous the far-sighted group, for instance, 
β =2, the less votes are required from the far-sighted group to reach the pure 
Bismarckian system. When β =2, this value drops to θ =2/3. On the contrary, if the 
myopic agents are more politically homogenous, for instance, β =0.5, a larger 
proportion of the far-sighted individuals is required for a pure Bismarckian pension 
system. While β =0.5, this value raises up to θ =8/3. 
The correlation of the equilibrium payroll tax rate and θ  under different values of 
β  is shown in the following Figure 4. As mentioned before, the total effect of the 
myopic agents to the equilibrium payroll tax rate is ambiguous. The U-Shaped curve 
depicted in Figure 4 could be explained as follows: in the left side of the graph, the 
payroll tax rate decreases with the size of the farsighted group, this is rather intuitive. 
Consider the relationship when β =1, if 0<θ <1 the myopic group has a bigger size 
than the far-sighted group. Given that the myopic group is in need of social security to 
secure consumption after retirement, not surprisingly, the payroll tax rate level is quite 
high. When θ  increases indicating the increase in the size of the farsighted group, 
the payroll tax rate decreases as the farsighted group wants to reduce the labor 
distortion effect and the redistribution effect associated with the payroll tax rate. It is 
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worth noting that the payroll tax rate falls to its lowest value until the two groups 
become equally politically powerful, namely θ =1. The interesting point is that when 
θ >1, indicating that the far-sighted group politically rules over the myopic group, the 
payroll tax rate starts to rise again. 
 
Figure 4: The Relation of the Equilibrium Tax Tate *τ  and θ   
 
Remark: Figure 4 illustrates how the payroll tax rate τ  is influenced by the size ratio (
F
M
λθ λ= ) 
and the political ideology density ratio (
F
M
φβ φ= ) of the far-sighted group to the myopic group. 
 
 
Eq. (23) shows that the political parties care for the following effects: the distortion 
effects for both groups, the consumption smoothing concern for the myopic group, the 
redistribution effect for the myopic group. Given that these effects are related with the 
Bismarckian factor, we explain this point in Figure 5, in which it shows that the 
equilibrium payroll tax rate is U-shaped with respect to the equilibrium Bismarckian 
factor. 
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Figure 5: The Relation of the Equilibrium Tax Tate *τ  and the Equilibrium 
Bismarckian Factor *α  
 
Note: The equilibrium payroll tax rate and the Bismarckian factor depends on the value of 
k θβ= , the product of the size ratio and the political ideology density ratio ( β ) of the 
far-sighted group to the myopic group. 
 
Each point on the curve responds to a specific value of k  where k θβ= . When 
k  is zero the Bismarckian factor is one half. In the left side of the curve, the 
equilibrium payroll tax rate decreases with the value of k . k  equals to 1 when the 
curve reaches its minimum. In the right side of the curve, the equilibrium payroll tax 
rate increases with the value of k  which corresponds to the findings in Figure 4 as 
well. Finally the curve stops at 1(1, )
4
 where the farsighted group reaches its 
preferred Bismarckian factor. At the same time, the payroll tax rate in the equilibrium 
is as well the equilibrium payroll tax rate of the myopic group.28 The equilibrium 
payroll tax rate in the left hand part of this U-shaped curve coincides with the left 
hand side of the curve in Figure 4. Obviously, in the left side part, the myopic group is 
more politically powerful, however, when the curve moves to the right, the myopic 
                                                        
28 See the second point of the Proposition 1. 
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group becomes less political stronger, therefore, the political parties rise α  and 
reduce τ  to favor the far-sighted voters. This trend keeps until the payroll tax rate 
reaches its minimum. We can see from Figure 5, the curve reaches the bottom when 
the two groups are equally politically powerful. Interestingly, the payroll tax rate 
starts to increase when the far-sighted are more political powerful. As the myopic 
agents’ second period consumption is less than that of the far-sighted, thus, it is easier 
for the politicians to turn them by rising their utility in the second period than that of 
the far-sighted agents. Hence, what matters now is '( )
'( )
F
M
u d
u d
. Therefore, the right hand 
side of the curve could be explained that the political parties strategically increases 
the Bismarckian factor to keep favoring the far-sighted agents but also rises the 
payroll tax rate to attract the swing voters in myopic group.  
This section presented a numerical simulation of the model under the assumption of 
a logarithmic period utility function (namely, ( ) ( )u x n x= A ). The findings from the 
numerical simulations can be summarized as follows. First, the equilibrium payroll 
tax rate is U-shaped with respect to the equilibrium Bismarckian factor in the 
economy (see Figure 5). Second, the equilibrium Bismarckian factor increases with 
the relative size of the farsighted group in the economy (see Figure 3). The shape of 
the curve depends on the value of β , namely the political ideology density ratio of 
the far-sighted to the myopic group. The higher β  is, namely the more politically 
homogeneous the far-sighted group becomes, the steeper the curve becomes; this 
implies that the far-sighted are able to obtain their preferred Bismarckian factor of 
unity when they have a smaller relative size (namely, when the value of θ is smaller). 
Finally, the optimal payroll tax rate is U-shaped with respect to the relative size of the 
farsighted group (see Figure 4). The shape of the curve depends on the value of β . 
The higher β  is, the lower is the value of θ associated with a minimum of the curve 
and the steeper the curve becomes. 
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4. Link with the Stylized Facts 
In this section, we relate the results from our model to some stylized facts in the 
characteristics of the existing pension systems. The U-shape feature between the 
payroll tax rate and the Bismarckian factor provided in Figure 5 may partially explain 
the stylized facts in Figure 6 where the payroll tax rate and the Bismarckian factor are 
positively related. Note that the purpose of our simulation is not to draw quantitative 
predictions, but instead, to provide qualitative comparison.  
Figure 6 shows graphically the characteristics of social security in some OECD 
member countries.29  
 
Figure 6: Characteristics of the Pension Systems in OECD Countries30 
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Source: The Bismarckian Index α  taken from OECD (2005), The Effective Contribution Rate 
                                                        
29 [0,1]α ∈  (For 1
2
α > , we have Bismarckian pension system and Beveridgean system for 1
2
α < , see i.e. 
Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007)) 
30 To produce better fitted graph with the data in Table 2.B.1, we use the stata command “qfit” to illustrate 
two-way quadratic prediction plots. 
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τ  taken from Disney (2004)31. See Table B.1 in the appendix for the detailed data. 
 
In particular we consider the following countries: Austria, France, Germany, 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain and UK. It is shown that when the contribution rate is 
sufficiently large, the Bismarckian social security system is associated with larger 
public pension expenditures. These facts are in contrast to the political economy 
theories of social security which predict that Beveridgean systems, involving 
intragenerational redistribution, should enjoy larger support than Bismarckian ones.32 
Previous political economy literature33 solves this puzzle in different frameworks 
rather than the probabilistic voting model. Based on European data, Koethenbuerger 
et al. (2008) argue that the median voter is typically middle-aged with high income 
and prefers a less generous system with a higher redistribution degree. Conde-Ruiz 
and Profeta (2007) apply the notion of issue-by-issue voting to address this puzzle 
focusing on income inequality, conclude a Beveridgean system may be supported by 
the low income voters in favor of the redistribution components while the high 
income supporters vote for the reduced size of the pension system. Krieger and Traub 
(2008) provide empirical and experimental explanations for this puzzle relying on the 
effects from income inequality and life expectancy. The current paper tries to explain 
this puzzle in an economy with both farsighted and myopic agents, where social 
security functions as a redistribution and commitment device for the myopic group 
while causes distortions to the farsighted group. The social security in the political 
equilibrium is to compromise the above effects. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  The present paper extends the literature on the optimal design of social security 
systems taking into account the presence of myopic agents. Cremer et al. (2007) study 
                                                        
31 The average effective contribution rate is derived as the average replacement rate divided by the support ratio. 
See Box 1 in Disney (2004) for a detailed explanation of the calculation methods. 
32 See Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2002) for a detailed discussion.  
33 See Casamatta et al. (2000a), Cremer and Pestieau (1998) and Pestieau (1999), Cremer et al. (2007). 
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the optimal social security policy under majority voting when agents differ both in 
their productivity and in their myopic degree. People vote sequentially, first for the 
Bismarckian factor, then for the payroll tax rate. The Bismarckian factor takes only 
two extreme values: either 0 or 1. Given that the poor (and liquidity constrained) 
farsighted agents prefer the same policy as their myopic counterparts, their model 
reaches the “ends against the middle” type of equilibria where where low and high 
ability voters oppose the ones with intermediate ability (vote on the payroll tax for a given 
Bismarckian factor). Cremer et al. (2007) focus on the influence of myopic agents to 
the social security system but neglect the relationship of the generosity of the system 
and the redistribution degree taking into account in the presence of myopic agents. 
Instead, the present paper adopts the probabilistic voting framework, in which the 
optimal payroll tax rate and the Bismarckian factor are determined simultaneously in 
the voting equilibrium. Moreover, a more general solution is adopted where the 
Bismarckian factor is continuous between 0 and 1 is allowed.   
The present paper is also related to the literature applying probabilistic voting in the 
design of social security policy. In an OLG model, Profeta (2002) focuses on the 
intergenerational political support from the old group’s influence to the political 
outcome in social security policies. She emphasizes on the “single-mindedness” of the 
old group in the support of intergenerational transfers. The main conclusion of her 
work is that retirement increases the level of ideological homogeneity of the old 
generation as they have more leisure time. This increase in their political power 
allows them to win the political game and to receive a positive transfer from the 
young. More recently, in a probabilistic voting framework, Gonzalez-Eiras and 
Niepelt (2008) focus on the dynamical politico-economic equilibrium. Political 
competition resolves the conflict between old and young voters by shifting some of 
the cost of the social security system to future generations. As a consequence, 
intergenerational transfers are too large, relative to a system balancing the interests of 
all generations. Unlike the works mentioned above focusing on redistribution related 
to leisure, intergenerational game or income inequality, the present paper focuses 
specifically on the redistribution resulting from myopia. 
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To be more specific, we explore the social security scheme consisting of a 
Bismarckian factor and a payroll tax rate in a society with both myopic and farsighted 
agents in which the political equilibrium is determined through probabilistic voting. 
The individuals live for two periods: work by choosing their labor supply in the first 
and retire in the second period. The individuals differ in being myopic or farsighted 
and in their political ideologies. The farsighted agents naturally smooth their 
consumption between the two periods, whereas the myopic agents behave myopically 
in the market stage by simply consuming all of their disposable income, regretting so 
in the second period. The social security causes labor supply distortions to both 
groups. The farsighted are less distorted as they see the link between the pension 
payment and contribution component in the pension benefits. In the voting stage, 
which occurs before the market stage, young agents vote on the social security 
scheme offered by two competing parties. Both the farsighted agents and the myopic 
agents are assumed to vote rationally for the social security scheme according to their 
long-term preferences. This is because the myopic agents are assumed to be 
sophisticated. This means that they anticipate in the voting stage that their myopic 
behavior will emerge later in the market stage. Thus, the myopic agents use the 
pension system as a way to commit themselves into forced savings. In order to focus 
on the steady-state political equilibrium, the paper assumes that the interest rate and 
the population growth rate are equal and set them equal to zero.  
Unlike Cremer et al. (2007), who treat the size of the myopic and farsighted groups 
as common knowledge, the present paper introduces uncertainty to these variables. 
When an individual makes decision in voting, he needs information about the size of 
both groups estimate average social income, thus, to understand the pension benefits 
he may receive when retired. 
It turns out that the optimal Bismarckian factor in the political equilibrium has the 
following features. With only rational individuals voting, either a purely Bismarckian 
system or simply no social security is preferred. The myopic group’s preferred policy 
is instead to select an intermediate Bismarckian system, with a value of 0.5α =  (the 
pure Beveridgean and Bismarckian systems being characterized by α=0 and α=1, 
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respectively), due to the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution concerns. The 
case of a mixed society is rather complicated. A pure Bismarckian system is preferred 
as long as the relative political power (the product of the size ratio and the political 
homogeneity ratio) of the farsighted group to the myopic group rules over the 
redistribution concern for the myopic group. However, a value of the Bismarckian 
parameter α between the values corresponding to the optimal systems for each of the 
two groups is a possibility, depending on their relative political power. 
As regards the equilibrium payroll tax rate in the mixed society, several effects 
determine the equilibrium payroll tax rate: the consumption smoothing concern for 
the myopic group, the labor distortion effects for both groups, the redistribution 
effects from the farsighted to the myopic group. Note that all the above effects are 
weighted with the size, the density as well as the second period marginal utility of the 
relevant group. Thus, the net effect of the proportion of the myopic individuals on the 
equilibrium payroll tax rate is ambiguous. However, an interesting result emerges 
when the social security system is purely Bismarckian (see Proposition 2). In this case, 
the equilibrium payroll tax rate is the one preferred by the myopic group. As a pure 
contributive pension system generates no redistribution, the farsighted individuals are 
indifferent in the value of the payroll tax rate. Thus, the payroll tax serves purely as a 
forced saving method for the myopic individuals. 
The results in the numerical simulation illustrate our theoretical findings. When a 
group is more politically homogenous, a lower size is required for this group to 
achieve its desired social security scheme. Moreover, the optimal payroll tax rate is 
U-shaped with respect to the Bismarckian factor which may partially explain why, in 
practice, Bismarckian pension systems tend to be associated with a larger pension 
base compared to the Beveridgean systems. A possible explanation of these features is 
to balance the commitment concerns of myopic agents and the efficiency concerns of 
the farsighted agents.  
A direction for future research would be to modify or relax some of the 
assumptions of the model, to see whether or not the main results are sensitive to some 
specific assumptions being made. First, following Cremer et al. (2007), the 
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assumption of homogeneous productivity could be relaxed. One simple way would be 
to introduce low productive consumers who face borrowing constraints into the model. 
This would allow us to introduce redistribution concerns from high productivity 
agents to low productivity agents into the design of the social security system. Second, 
the paper has assumed a unitary inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, with a log 
linear specification of utility in the simulation section. Given that many empirical 
studies suggest that the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is less than unity, an 
obvious step would be to incorporate this assumption into the model. However, we 
know from standard OLG models that when one deviates from log linear utilities, this 
opens up the possibility of multiple steady-state market equilibria in the model. Thus, 
it remains unclear a priori to what extent our results would be affected by the 
deviation from the assumption of a unitary inter-temporal elasticity. Finally, the paper 
has assumed a form of quasi linear preferences in first period consumption (with a 
quadratic disutility of labor), which implies that there is no income effect on labor 
supply following a change in the wage rate. In turn, this means that the elasticity of 
labor supply with respect to the tax rate can become quite large when the system is 
not purely Bismarckian (in which case the Marshallian elasticity is zero for the 
farsighted agents) which may not be consistent with the existing empirical evidence of 
the tax effects on labor supply, especially for males. This for sure restricting the 
analysis and should be take into account in future research by the application of 
different utility functions. 
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Appendix 
A.1: the optimal labor supply for each group 
For the far-sighted individuals, The first order conditions to the maximization 
problem: 
{ }: '( )[(1 ) ] '( ) 0
{ }: '( )( 1) '( ) 0
F
F F F F
F
F
F F F
F
UFoc l u x l u d
l
UFoc s u x u d
s
τ τα∂  = − − + =∂
∂  = − + =∂
 
An interior solution (with is >0) requires the life time utility of the far-sighted 
differentiate with respect to saving is equal to zero. Thus, implies F Fx d= . Thus, the 
optimal level of labor supply for the far-sighted is: 
                         (1 )Fl τ τα= − +                          (A1) 
As for the myopic individuals, the labor supply and saving pattern:  
{ }: '( )[(1 ) ] 0MM M M
M
UFoc l u x l
l
τ∂  = − − =∂  
As assumed, the myopic individuals do not save, thus, 0Ms = , and the optimal 
level of labor supply is: 
1Ml τ= −                              (A2) 
 
A.2: The indirect utility function for each group 
The budget constraints for both groups are: 
(1 )i i i
i i i
x s l
d s p
τ+ = −
= +  
Now we need to derive the pension for each group separately, 
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[ (1 ) ]
(1 )
i i
F F M F
p l El
El l E l E
τ α α
λ λ
= + −
= + −  
Thus, substitute Fl  and Ml  from A1 and A2 into Eq. (7), we obtain the pension 
for the far-sighted and myopic individuals: 
2
2
1(1 )
2
(1 )[ (1 ) ] (1 )
2
(1 )[ (1 ) ] (1 )
2
F F M M
F F
M M
Ewl l E l E
p l El
p l El
λ λ τ τα
τ α ατ α α τ τ
τ α ατ α α τ τ
= + = − +
+= + − = − +
−= + − = − +
        (A3) 
Thus, the indirect utility function for the far-sighted could be obtained in following 
steps; Firstly, from the budget constraints, the saving function for the far-sighted is: 
2
(1 )
2
2
F
F F
F
ll p
s
τ− − −
=                       (A4) 
Substitute (A2) and (A3) to (A4), the savings of far-sighted could be interpreted as 
a function of ( , )τ α : 
2 2 2 21 3 12
2 2 2F
s τ τ τ α τ α= − + − −                (A5) 
Remember, the far-sighted agents smooth their consumption over time, thus, 
2
(1 )
2
2
F
F F
F F F F
ll p
x d s p
τ− − +
= = + =  
Substitute Fp  from Eq. (A3) into Eq. (A5), 
21 (1 )
4F F
x d α τ− −= =  
Therefore, the indirect utility function for the far-sighted is: 
21 (1 )( , ) ( ) ( ) 2 [ ]
4
F
F FV u x u d u
α ττ α − −= + =            (A6) 
As for the myopic individuals: 
(1 )M M
M M
x l
d p
τ= −
=  
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Substitute Ml  from (A2) and Mp  from (A3), the indirect utility function for the 
myopic agents is obtained in following form: 
2 2(1 ) (1 )( , ) [ ] [ (1 ) ]
2 2
MV u uτ τ α ατ α τ τ− −= + − +            (A7) 
 
A.3: Group-specific preference (Proof for Proposition 1) 
The optimal social security for the far-sighted household: 
The first order condition to maximize FV  w.r.t ,α τ  given , [0,1]α τ ∈  is 
obtained accordingly, 
2
'( ) ( 1)
'( )
2
F
F
F
F
dV u x
d
dV u x
d
τ ατ
τ
α
⎧ = −⎪⎪⎨⎪ =⎪⎩
                      (A8) 
The critical point is ( ,  ) (0,  1)τ α = . According to the second derivatives test,  
2 2
2
2
2 4
2
2 3
''( )( 1) '( )( 1)
2
''( )
8
''( ) ( 1) '( )
 4
F
F F
F
F
M
F F
V u x u x
V u x
V u x u x
τα ατ
τ
α
τ α τα τ
⎧∂ = − + −⎪ ∂⎪∂⎪ =⎨ ∂⎪⎪ ∂ = − +⎪∂ ∂⎩
             (A9) 
Obviously
2
2
FV
τ
∂
∂  and 
2
2 0
FV
α
∂ <∂ in the critical point, however, the Hessian Matrix 
is 0FH =  implying negative semidefinite, therefore, we need to characterize the 
maximization problem in a more general form: 
As 0
FdV
dτ ≤ , the critical value for τ  to maximize FV  is 0τ = , in this case, 
obviously we have * *[0,  1],  0F Fα τ∈ = . 
As 0
FdV
dα ≥ , the critical value for α  to maximize FV  is 1α = , although there is 
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no specific requirement for τ ,  Fs  needs to be non-negative. Therefore, we have 
* *1,  [0,  1]F Fα τ= ∈ . 
In sum, the optimal social security for far-sighted agents are two solution sets: 
* *1,  [0,  1]
  sec
F F
No social urity
α τ⎧ = ∈⎨⎩
 
The optimal social security for the myopic household: 
The first order condition to maximize MV  w.r.t ,α τ  given , [0,1]α τ ∈  is 
obtained accordingly, 
2
'( )( 1) '( )[1 2 (1 )]
1'( ) ( )
2
M
M M
M
M
dV u x u d
d
dV u d
d
τ τ τα ατ
τ αα
⎧ = − + − + −⎪⎪⎨⎪ = −⎪⎩
        (A8) 
The critical point we obtained is: 
* * '( ) '( )1 ,  72 '( ) '( )
4
M M
M M
M M
u x u d
u x u d
α τ −= =
−
 
Noticing that, M Mx d> , thus, 7'( ) '( ) '( )4M M Mu x u d u d< < , further more,  
7 [ '( ) '( )] '( ) '( )
4M M M M
u x u d u x u d− > − , therefore, *0 1τ< < . Also, the more 
concave the utility function, the lower the value *τ  is. 
Now we take the second partial derivative test: 
2
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M M M M
M
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V u x u x u d u d
V u d u d
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τ τ τα α α ατ
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τ α τ τα α α τα τ
⎧∂ = − + + − + − + − −⎪ ∂⎪∂⎪ = − −⎨ ∂⎪⎪ ∂ = − − + − + −⎪∂ ∂⎩
   (A9) 
Obviously, 
2
2
MV
τ
∂
∂  and 
2
2 0
MV
α
∂ <∂ , the determinant of the Hessian Matrix 
0MH >  for * *( , )M Mα τ . Therefore, * *( , )M Mα τ  is the optimal local maximum for MV . 
Moreover,  
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As ' 0,  '' 0u u> < , we have: 
*
*
10      
2
10      
2
M
M
when
when
τ αα
τ αα
⎧∂ > >⎪⎪ ∂⎨∂⎪ < <⎪ ∂⎩
 
 
A.4: The policy in the political equilibrium in a mixed economy 
In order to obtain the most preferred payroll tax rates τ  and the level of α , we 
have to substitute ( )M NV P  and ( )F NV P  which are defined respectively in Eq. (A4) 
and (A5).  Parties act simultaneously, taking the choice of the other party candidate 
as given, and do not cooperate. Therefore, for instance, politician A would maximize a 
weighted welfare function obtained from Eq. (18). Given the problem is symmetric 
for politician B, we write the optimization problem for politician N as follows: 
,
{ [ ( ) ( )]}N i i i N i N
i F M
W E V P V Pλ φ −
=
= −∑              (A10) 
Thus, the FOCs are obtained accordingly: 
,
,
( ){ }: 0
( ){ }: 0
N i N
i i
i F M
N i N
i i
i F M
dW dV PFoc
d d
dW dV PFoc
d d
τ λ φτ τ
α λ φα α
=
=
 = =
 = =
∑
∑
           (A11) 
Substitute Eq. (A7) and (A9) into first order Eq. (A11), we obtain the general 
solution for the payroll tax rates and the Bismarckian factor. Setting the first order 
conditions equal to zero yields a system of two equations that jointly determine the 
most preferred value for τ  and α . 
[ '( ) '( )]
[ '( ) '( )] (1 ) '( ) '( ) (1 ) '( )
M M
M M
M M F F M M M M
M M F M M
u x u d
u x u d u d u d u d
λ φτ λ φ α λ φ λ φ α α λ φ
−= − − − − + − A12(1) 
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* '( )1
2 2 '( )
F F
F
M M
M
u d
u d
λ φα λ φ= +                      A12(2)  
Note, (0,1)α ∈ , therefore, the Bismarckian factor α  in the local equilibrium is 
derived accordingly, 
*
'( )1          for  '( ) '( )               A13(1) 
2 2 '( )
1                                      for  '( ) '( )               A13(2)
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When '( ) '( )F F M MF Mu d u dλ φ λ φ< , * '( )12 2 '( )
F F
F
M M
M
u d
u d
λ φα λ φ= + , we obtain a more 
compact form of the equilibrium tax rate τ  by substituting the equilibrium 
Bismarckian factor α  from Eq. A13(1) into the Eq. (A11).  
*
2
[ '( ) '( )]                            (A14)
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See from A13(2), when '( ) '( )F F M MF Mu d u dλ φ λ φ≥ , we can not derive the 
equilibrium social security policy from the Eq. (A12) directly. Thus, it is considered 
as a special case. Therefore, we have to substitute the equilibrium Bismarckian factor 
in which * 1α =  directly to the Lagrange problem A(10) so as to derive the 
equilibrium payroll tax rate, and the expression of the equilibrium payroll tax rate is 
as follows: 
'( ) '( )
'( ) 2 '( )
M M
M M
u x u d
u x u d
τ −= −  
To sum up, in the mixed economy, the equilibrium social security policy is in the 
following form: 
When '( ) '( )F F M MF Mu d u dλ φ λ φ< , 
*
* *
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'( ) '( )[ '( ) 2 '( )] [1 ]
4 '( )
F F
F
M M
M
M M
F F
M F
M M M M
M
u d
u d
u x u d
u d u du x u d
u d
λ φα λ φ
α τ τ λ φ
λ φ
⎧ = +⎪⎪⎪= −⎨ =⎪⎪ − + −⎪⎩
  A(15) 
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  When '( ) '( )F F M MF Mu d u dλ φ λ φ≥ , 
*
* *
*
1
( , ) '( ) '( )
'( ) 2 '( )
M M
M M
u x u d
u x u d
α
α τ τ
⎧ =⎪= −⎨ =⎪ −⎩
                    A(16) 
 
A.5: Proof for Proposition 2 
To show the second order condition, we first conduct the Hessian Matrix for the 
optimization problem associated with Eq.(18): 
2 2
2
* *
2 2
2
       
 ( , )
       
 
N N
N N
W W
H
W W
τ α τα τ
τ α α
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥= ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
 
Therefore, there is a unique local equilibrium as long as the Hessian Matrix is 
negative definite with respect to the equilibrium solution * *( , )τ α . In our case when 
'( ) '( )F F M MF Mu x u dλ φ λ φ< , this condition is satisfied. When 
'( ) '( )F F M MF Mu x u dλ φ λ φ≥ , the equilibrium social security * *( , )τ α is 
(
'( ) '( )
'( ) 2 '( )
M M
M M
u x u d
u x u d
−
− , 1). The second order conditions are satisfied as well. 
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Table B.1: Characteristics of the pension systems 
 
Country              Bismarckian Index       Effective Contribution Rate  
 
Austria 0.793 34.8 
France 0.536 27.7 
Germany 0.771 22.4 
Greece  0.957 57.7 
Portugal 0.689 35.4 
Italy  0.96 40 
Spain  0.87 45 
UK  0.304 23.7 
Source: The Bismarckian Index α  is taken from OECD(2005), The Effective Contribution Rate τ  is taken 
from Disney (2004). 
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